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When An Individual is Killed By the Use of Force,
the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Requires That There be an
Effective Investigation and an Effective Remedy
Available: Edwards v. United Kingdom
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS - CONVENTION FOR
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS -
ARTICLE 2 - ARTICLE 13 - EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION - EFFECTIVE
REMEDY - The European Court of Human Rights held that a
country who is a signatory to the Convention for Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms must provide an effec-
tive investigation, including an opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses, and an effective remedy when a person dies while in police
custody.
Edwards v. United Kingdom, 2002 WL 347058 (ECHR).
On November 27, 1994, Christopher Edwards was arrested in
Colchester for making lewd comments to women while walking
down the street.! He was taken to the police station where he ad-
dressed a female officer in a similar manner leading those on duty
to believe he may suffer from a mental illness.2 Edwards then
spoke with a social worker who discussed her findings by phone
with a psychiatrist.3 Being unaware of Edwards' prior mental ill-
ness, the two agreed that he was not in need of immediate atten-
tion and could continue to be held at the station.4
The following day, Edwards was taken to the Colchester Magis-
trates' Court where he continued to make lewd suggestions about
1. Edwards v. United Kingdom, 2002 WL 347058, at *6 (ECHR).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. There was agreement, however, between the sociologist and psychologist that
Edwards' behavior may be an indication that schizophrenic behavior was beginning to
occur. The policewoman was unaware that her own assessment of Edwards was enough to
justify characterizing him as high risk and she did not complete a Form CID2, which would
have indicated that Edwards was a high-risk prisoner according to the social worker. How-
ever, the officer did write in the Confidential Information Form (MG6A) that, in her own
opinion, if Edwards did not receive psychiatric attention, he may harm a female. Following
the administrative procedures, Edwards was placed in a cell by himself. Id.
409
410 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
women to a female prison officer and the duty solicitor.5 While
entertaining the possibility of sending Edwards to a hospital, the
Bench held that it lacked the authority to do so and remanded
Edwards to police custody.6
When Edwards arrived at Chelmsford Prison, he was isolated
from the other arrivals where his conduct was noted as abnormal
and violent.7 At the time Edwards was finally interviewed, no
medical doctor was present and the only thing that Mr. N., a
member of the health care staff, knew was that Edwards had at-
tacked a female constable.' Since Edwards displayed no abnor-
mal behavior during the 10-minute interview, he was accepted
into the main prison and transferred to his own cell.9
In a separate case, Richard Linford was arrested in Maldon for
attacking his friend and her neighbor."° At the station, a police
surgeon spoke with Linford and believed that he might be men-
tally ill." However, a psychiatric registrar, who knew that Linford
had a history of schizophrenia and drug abuse, spoke with a con-
5. Id. Upon arrival at the courthouse, Edwards broke through a crowd of prisoners
and made lewd remarks to a female prison officer. He was detained in a cell by himself and
upon being brought back in to the courtroom, continued to make obscene remarks. It was
at this time that Edwards' parents spoke with the duty solicitor about their son's prior
mental illness and sought to have him released from custody so that he could obtain medi-
cal treatment. The prosecutor, though, wanted to have Edwards returned to police custody
since it was believed that he would be a repeat offender and that his mental state was
questionable. It was also necessary, according to the prosecutor, that further psychiatric
evaluations be made. Id.
6. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *6-7. The Bench was basing its decision on the Mag-
istrates' Courts Act of 1980. However, those involved with the case failed to consider the
Mental Health Act of 1983, which had civil provisions providing for evaluation in a hospital
setting. Following the hearing, Edwards' father contacted the probation officer at Chelms-
ford prison and informed him of his son's prior mental illness. He was told that Edwards
was prescribed stelazine, but refused the medication. Id. at *7. However, given the report
by the social worker of no immediate medical attention being necessary, the senior medical
doctor decided that normal procedures for admission would be followed. The probation
officer informed the doctor in the Health Care Centre of the conversation with Edwards'
father, but it was unclear how much of that conversation was conferred to the doctor. The
police officers, though, had informed the prison staff of Edwards' behavior prior to his arri-
val and suggested that he might be a threat to females given his previous conduct. Id.
7. Id. at *7. Edwards attempted to strike a prison officer. Id.
8. Id. The concerns of the prosecutor and police were not conveyed to the reception
staff and Edwards did not disclose that he was prescribed stelazine. Edwards did reveal
that he had been seen by a psychiatrist three years ago. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *7.
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sultant psychiatrist on the phone.12 They concluded that Linford
did not require hospital admission and could be held. 3
While being detained at the station, Linford continued to dis-
play strange behavior and to assault police officers, however, he
was never reevaluated by a doctor.14 Linford was presented to the
magistrate as "sane but dangerous."" When Linford arrived at
Chelmsford Prison, the same people that spoke with Edwards in-
terviewed him. 6 At this time, Linford was behaving appropri-
ately. 7 Linford was initially detained in a cell on his own but be-
cause of limited space was moved in with Edwards. 8
Late that night, a prison officer heard a pounding sound on one
of the landings. 9 Upon entering the cell, the officer found Ed-
wards lying dead on the floor with Linford standing above him
saying that he (Linford) was possessed by "evil spirits and dev-
ils." 20 After pleading guilty to manslaughter "by reason of dimin-
ished responsibility,"21 Linford was found to be mentally ill and
transferred to a Special Hospital.22
Following Linford's sentencing, the Coroner's inquest was
closed.23  Edwards' parents were informed that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to charge anyone with manslaughter by gross neg-
12. Id.
13. Id. The registrar attributed Linford's behavior to drug abuse. Id at *8.
14. Id. at *8. In addition, no form CID2 was completed by the police officers even
though they continued to believe he was unstable. Id.
15. Id.
16. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *8.
17. Id. The individuals who spoke with Linford saw no reason to further assess his
mental condition and Mr. N. was not aware of Linford's previous criminal record, which
would have informed him of a prior prison hospital admission in 1988. Id.
18. Id. The cell was equipped with a security system that could be activated by the
prisoners in the event of an emergency and, at some point, either Linford or Edwards
pressed the button that engaged the system. An officer, noticing that the green light out-
side the cell was activated, checked on the prisoners to find that everything was all right.
The system was not working properly, though, because a buzzer should have gone off, and a
red light should have been activated on a control panel. Even if the prisoner stopped press-
ing the alarm button, the buzzer was still supposed to sound. However, the buzzer did not
sound, and the officer did not report the malfunction. Id.
19. Id. The prison officer had heard a buzzer sound earlier accompanied by a red light
on the control panel. At that time, he saw another officer checking on the situation. Id.
20. Id. at *8. When an officer went to investigate the situation, he saw the green light
outside of the cell on and Linford holding a plastic fork with blood on it. It took the officers
around five minutes to get into the cell and it was 17 minutes since the cell was last pa-
trolled. Upon entering the cell, the officers found that Edwards was stomped and kicked to
death. Id.
21. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *8.
22. Id. Linford was sentence under section 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act of 1983.
He was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. Id.
23. Id.
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ligence for their son's death. However, they could recover for fu-
neral costs and for pain and suffering.24
A private non-statutory inquiry was initiated by the Prison Ser-
vice, the County Council and the Health Authority, all of whom
owed a statutory duty to Edwards.25 It had no power to subpoena
witnesses or documents and two of the prison officers refused to
appear and testify.26 Edwards' parents were informed after the
Inquiry that there were no civil remedies available to them and
that criminal charges would not be filed against any of the indi-
viduals or agencies involved. 2' As a result, Paul and Audrey Ed-
wards filed an application against the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland in the European Court of Human
Rights under Article 34 of the Convention for Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention).28  The application
claimed that the agencies involved had failed to guard their son's
life and it sought to establish a case under Articles 2, 6, 8, and 13
of the Convention.29
Under Article 2, "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by
law... " " The provision requires not just that the State avoid in-
24. Id. at *9. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board granted the parents 4550
GBP for funeral expenses but concluded there would be no "dependency or bereavement
award." Id.
25. Id.
26. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *9. The officer that passed by Edwards' door the
night he was murdered declined to testify. Id. The Report concluded that Edwards and
Linford should never have been in prison yet alone placed in a cell together. It also estab-
lished a failure among all the parties involved to communicate all of the necessary informa-
tion, a violation of the Prison Health Service Standards by not having a medical doctor
present upon admissions, and a defective and inadequate security cell system was in place
since it could be disabled with a matchstick by a prison officer who did not want to hear the
buzzer. Id. at *10. The Inquiry findings also stated that a doctor should have been re-
quested by the officer to see Edwards; that the police failed to complete the necessary pa-
perwork which would have alerted others to Edwards being high risk because of his mental
state; that the Magistrates' Court should have considered admitting Edwards to a hospital
for further evaluation; that there was a break down of communication among the agencies
involved; that Mr. N. was inadequately trained to detect mental disturbances; and that
since the parties knew Linford was high risk, a formal warning should have been issued to
the prison officials. Id. at *10-11.
27. Id. at *11. Since the inquiry failed to determine a time span between Edwards'
injuries and his death, no remedy for Edwards' pain and suffering prior to his death was
available. In addition, under the common law no one can be awarded damages in tort for
the death of another person. While the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 permits damages, it
only applies to the deceased's dependents, parents of a child under 18, and recovery for
funeral expenses. Since Edwards had no dependents and he was over 18, his parents were
only entitled to funeral expenses. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id. at *12.
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tentionally taking the life of another, but also that it takes the
necessary measures to prevent a breach of the Article.3 In each
instance in the present case, the authorities either knew or should
have known that Linford was mentally ill. 32 His prior medical his-
tory and record of violent attacks should have been conveyed to
the prison authorities as well as to those who had the ability to
place him in the Health Care Prison.3' However, because of poor
communication between all of the agencies involved, Linford's
background was overlooked and instead of the authorities using
caution, Linford was treated the same as any other prisoner."
The same breakdowns in the system occurred with Edwards.35
In spite of his perceived mental state, a doctor was not requested
to examine him at the police station, the forms documenting his
state were not recorded and the information known to the police
officer, the court and the applicants was not passed on to the
prison medical officer.36 Because of these shortcomings and the
inadequate screening of Linford, the agencies involved failed to
protect the life of Edwards, thereby breaching Article 2 of the
Convention.
Also implied under Article 2, in order to protect the right to life
there should be a speedy and effective investigation when death
by use of force occurs.38 In this case, the Court found that civil
proceedings instituted by Edwards' family alone would not be suf-
ficient under Article 2 since Edwards' death occurred while he was
under the care of the state. 9 The problem with the investigation
31. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *14.
32. Id. at *15. The reports that he had been in the hospital before, was currently being
seen by a psychiatrist, taking medication for his schizophrenia, and being considered for
commitment under the Mental Health Act combined with his violent outbursts at the sta-
tion would have alerted the officials that he was a serious risk and that he should not have
been detained with Edwards. Id. at* 15-16.
33. Id. at *16.
34. Id. Had the registrar reviewed Linford's files, he would have found that, if Lin-
ford's current treatment failed, compulsory committal was an option. However, the regis-
trar did not check the information and when the prison officer received Linford, even
though he was bruised, the officer had no history to alert him of his previous mental health.
The Inquiry Report stated that if the prison health worker had known more about Linford,
he may have used more caution. Id. at *15. The standard, though, is not whether he knew
but whether he should have known. The Court says he should have known. Id. at *16.
35. Id.
36. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *16. The Inquiry Report also found that the screen-
ing health worker at the prison was insufficiently trained. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 19. However, relying on the Inquiry, the members stated that the report
adequately detailed the principle facts and while a list of prisoners to be interviewed was
Winter 2003 413
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arose from its inability to compel witnesses -- one of whom was the
last guard to walk by the cell before Edwards was killed.4" As a
result, the Inquiry's authority as an investigative and fact-finding
body was weakened and its Article 2 procedural requirement was
not achieved.4'
Since the Inquiry sat in private and then made its findings pub-
lic, the applicants were able to establish an Article 2 violation over
the lack of exposure received by the case.42 The court stated that
given the public nature of the agencies involved, the publicity re-
ceived by the event was not sufficient nor was an adequate reason
established for employing this type of investigation.43 In addition,
since Edwards' parents were unable to attend the hearings and
were unrepresented, their interests in the proceedings were not
adequately safeguarded.44 While Article 2 also requires that there
be a prompt hearing, given the extent of the Inquiry in this case,
there was no violation in this respect.
4'
In the original application to the court, Edwards' parents as-
serted that under Article 6 and Article 8 of the Convention, their
inability to bring civil proceedings in relation to the death of their
son and the absence of an independent investigative system was
disrespectful to family life.46  However, since no further issues
lost and the call system in the cell was never tested, the Court did not believe these details
disturbed the principal facts established by the Inquiry. Id. at 19-20.
40. Id. at 20. Even though the guard submitted a written report, he was not available
for questioning that may have revealed any discrepancies or oversights. Id.
41. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *20. The Inquiry was found to act, though, as an
independent body even though it was established by the agencies with statutory responsi-
bilities towards Edwards. The chairman was a senior member of the bar and the other
members had experience in the prison, police or medical fields. There was no showing that
they were influenced by the agencies, represented the agencies or operated in a dependent
capacity. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 20-2 1.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 21. Edwards died in 1994. The proceedings began in May 1996 and the final
report was issued in June 1998. In addition to the written evidence, about 150 people at-
tended the Inquiry and the members of the Inquiry traveled to the places involved and
interviewed Linford. Id.
46. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at * 22. Article 6 states that, "In the determination of
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribu-
nal established by law..." Id. at *21. Article 8 says:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right ex-
cept such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder of crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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were raised under these two sections in subsequent proceedings,
the Court did not reach the merits of these complaints.47
The final breach claimed by the applicants arose out of Article
13, which states that all those who suffer a violation of their rights
under the Convention are entitled to a remedy even if the viola-
tion is by someone behaving in an official capacity.4" The Inquiry
itself, while thorough in its investigation, did not present any pos-
sibility of recovering damages, and under Article 13, a bereaved
parent may be entitled to damages.49 As a result, Article 13 of the
Convention was breached. °
When breaches of the Convention are established, Article 41
permits the Court to award damages. 1 Edwards' family was
awarded non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses.52
The Court unanimously held in this case that Edwards' death
and the subsequent investigation constituted violations of Article
2 of the Convention." However, no separate issues arose under
Article 6 or 8, which the applicants had first raised in the proceed-
ings but had later declined to address.54 Article 13 was also vio-
lated since no assessment of damages was available to Edwards'
family.55 As a result of these violations, Article 41 permitted the
Court to award both pecuniary damages and cost and expenses
which arose out of the case.56
The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959
under The European Convention of Human Rights (Convention) in
order to enforce the rights enumerated in the United Nations Uni-
47. Id. at *22.
48. Id. Article 13 requires that there be a civil remedy available to anyone who raises a
claim under the provisions of the Convention. Id. However, States may enforce the provi-
sion as they deem appropriate as long as it meets the Convention standards and the rem-
edy corresponds to the nature of the complaint. The Article does not always necessitate
state inquiry action, but it does require that the victim's family have a way to establish the
liability of the state for any acts or omissions that contravene the Convention. In particu-
lar, if there is a violation of Article 2 or 3, there should be an award available for non-
pecuniary damages. Id. at 23.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *24.
52. Id. at *25. The Court awarded 20,000 GBP non-pecuniary damages and 20,000
GBP for costs and expenses. The Court awarded less under Cost and Expenses then the
applicants sought since they believed the expenses to be overestimated. The 20,000 GBP
awarded did not include the additional value added tax award. Both judgments were sub-
ject to a 7.5% interest rate. Id.
53. Id. at 26.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *24.
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versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948."7 The United King-
dom ratified the Convention in 1951 and in 1966 granted its citi-
zens the right to seek relief in the Human Rights Court provided
there were no effective domestic remedies.58 It was not until years
later that Parliament enacted the Humans Rights Act 1998, which
incorporated specific provisions of the Convention into domestic
law.59
Since the Humans Right Act 1998 came into force on October 2,
2000, the domestic court of England has only addressed two cases
under Article 2 and 3 of the Convention.6 ° In R. (on the applica-
tion of Wright) v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department,
the court had to decide whether Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention
had been breached as a result of the deceased prisoner's treatment
while in custody and the failure of officials to conduct a proper
investigation.6' The High Court, Administrative Court of England
and Wales concluded that the articles in question required the
state to conduct an effective investigation, the form of which
would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case." Wright
died in prison as a result of a severe asthma attack. 3 The medical
staff was aware of his condition but had failed to prescribe the
proper medication. 4 The inquest that was held following his
57. The European Court of Human Rights: Historical Background, Organization, and
Procedure (April 5, 2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/HistoricalBackground.htm. The
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed on
November 4, 1950 and entered into enforcement on September 1953. Id.
58. Christina M. Kitterman, The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998: Will
the Parliament Relinquish its Sovereignty to Ensure Human Rights Protection in Domestic
Courts?, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L 583, 588 (2001).
59. Susan R. Gihring, Book Note, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L 203 (2000) (reviewing The Human
Rights Act 1998 What it Means: The Incorporation of the European Convention on the
Human Rights in the Legal Order of the United Kingdom). The act adopted Article 2 to 12
and 14 of the Convention, 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and 1 and 2 of the 6th protocol in
conjunction with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998, C. 42,
§1, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts 1998/80042--a.htm.
60. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *12. Article 2 states that "Everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty
is provided by law." Article 3 reads, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AS AMENDED BY PROTOCOL No. 11, Art. 2 - 3, (No-
vember 1998), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
61. R. (on the application of Wright ) & Anor v. The Secretary of State for the Home
Department, 2001 WL 606447 at *3 (QBD (Admin. Ct.)).
62. Id. at *9.
63. Id. at *4.
64. Id. It was disputed how much time had elapsed between the time he arrested and
the time someone had come to his aid. Id.
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death was ineffective under Article 2 because key witnesses were
not called and no consideration was given to the inadequate medi-
cal treatment or the role the doctor played in Wright's treatment.65
In a similar case, The Queen (on the application of Amin) v. The
Secretary of State of the Home Department, the question was again
raised whether an effective investigation in accordance with Arti-
cle 2 had been conducted.66 The Court held that for the investiga-
tion to be proper it had to be independent and public with the fam-
ily adequately represented and able to cross-examine the main
witnesses. 7 The death of Mubarek, who was bludgeoned to death
by his cellmate, a known racist, was not adequately investigated
because it was not established why Mubarek was placed in the cell
with the man nor was the family appropriately represented in the
proceedings.68
Prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the European
Convention of Human Rights was not incorporated into the do-
mestic law and the domestic courts did not enforce the Conven-
tion.69 Therefore, the rights guaranteed by the Convention did not
have a definitive role in the legal community and the cases de-
cided by the European Court of Human Rights had no binding ef-
fect on the domestic courts." The Humans Right Act was only ap-
plicable for continuing violations that occurred after October 2,
2000, the date of enforcement.7 Therefore, for those claiming a
violation of the Convention prior to that date, petitioning the
European Court of Human Rights was the only option when the
domestic law provided an inadequate remedy.72
Article 2 of the Convention states that "Everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law."" In L.C.B. v. United Kingdom,74 the
European Court of Human Rights stated that the article "enjoins
the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful
65. Id.
66. The Queen on the application of Amin v. The Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, 2001 WL 1135068 at *1 (QBD (Admin. Ct.)).
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *4.
69. Andrew C. Geddis, Confronting the "Problem" of Third Party Expenditure in UK
Election Law, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 103, 116 (2001).
70. Id. at 116. However, the United Kingdom has generally amended the laws that
were found to be in conflict to the Convention. Id.
71. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *12.
72. Kitterman, supra note 52, at 588. The right to petition was granted in 1966. Id.
73. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, supra note 60, at Art. 2 §1.
74. 76 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1390 (1998).
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taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the
lives of those within its jurisdiction."75 The deciding factor in ar-
riving at a violation is not whether the state did everything possi-
ble given the facts of the case, but whether it did everything re-
quired of it to avoid a person from being placed at risk." The
Court held that the applicant's claim of having contracted leuke-
mia from her father's exposure to radiation as a serviceman did
not establish a sufficient causal link to find a violation of the Arti-
cle.77
In a separate case, a teacher shot and killed the father of one of
his pupils and wounded the pupil whom he had been stalking.78 It
was concluded that the individual events leading to the death
were not substantial enough to constitute a breach of Article 2."
The Court said that the obligation upon the authorities cannot be
such as to impose an impossible burden upon them. ° Rather, it
must be proven that the authorities knew or should have known of
the existence of a real and imminent danger from the criminal
acts of a third party and that they failed to take reasonable steps
to protect against that danger. 81
When death occurs while in custody, rigid scrutiny should be
applied since these people in particular are in a vulnerable posi-
tion.82 Case of Salman stated that it is the obligation of the au-
thorities to account for an individual's death and to provide a sat-
isfactory explanation.83 So, when no documentation could explain
the injuries to Salman's ankle, left foot, bruised chest, broken
sternum or his death while in detention, the court found a viola-
tion of Article 2.84 The burden of proof remains with the authori-
ties to formulate a convincing and satisfactory account of the
events.85
75. Id. at 1403.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1404. Evidence was never produced that established that the father had any
symptoms indicating exposure to high levels of radiation. The Court also found it unsub-
stantiated that, had the child been monitored in utero, the effects of leukemia would have
been less severe. Id.
78. Osman v. The United Kingdom, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124 (1998).
79. Id. at 3163.
80. Id. at 3159.
81. Id.
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The Human Rights Court has repeatedly cited in its cases that
when reading Article 2 together with Article 1, which "secure[s] to
everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in [the] Convention,"86 there is an implied obligation to conduct an
effective official investigation when individuals have been killed
by force." In McCann, officers of the United Kingdom shot and
killed several members of the IRA.88 The judges in the case stated
that "there should be some form of effective official investigation
when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force
by, inter alios [sic], agents of the state."89
In Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, the court summed up a
number of previous decisions in attempting to define "effective."0
It stated that the investigation should be prompt and reasonable,
independent from those involved, capable of determining whether
the force was justified, and subject to public scrutiny.9' The Court
held in this case that a civil remedy was available to the applicant
for the death of his son so there was no violation of Article 13.92
Handed down the same day as Hugh Jordan, Case of Kelly and
Others v. United Kingdom93 stated that the purpose behind the
investigation is to assure the effective execution of domestic laws
that protect the right to life and, where state agents are a party, to
guarantee that they are held answerable for deaths that occur un-
der their responsibility.94 The form of investigation that is re-
quired will differ with the facts and circumstances of each case,
86. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, supra note 60, at Art. 1.
87. Edwards, 35 E.H.H.R. at 18; Gfileq v. Turkey, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1698 at 1732
(1998); Hugh Jordan v. The United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23, at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=529033626&Notice
=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O; Salman, 2002 WL 33348683 at *31.
88. McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-30
(1995).
89. Id. at 49. The Court did not decide what type of investigation should have been
conducted since the inquest proceedings were public, witnesses were heard, and the appli-
cants were legally represented. In the court's opinion, there was no violation of Article 2.
Id.
90. Jordan, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 24. See, supra note 81.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 33-34. The applicants son, Pearse Jordan, was shot in the back three times
and killed by officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. No prosecution was initiated due to
insufficient evidence but the inquest and civil proceedings were still pending at the time
the case was decided. Id. at 4.
93. Kelly & Others v. The United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23, at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=529043430&Notice
=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O.
94. Id. at 23.
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but regardless, the state should institute the investigation
whether or not the next of kin does.95 The court also believed that
there was no breach of Article 13 since an effective remedy was
available.6
In the United Kingdom, the right to bring an action for a wrong-
ful act causing the death of another individual arises under the
Fatal Accidents Act 1976."7 However, a parent is only entitled to
bereavement damages if the deceased was "a minor who was never
married."98 Otherwise, the only damages permitted to the parents
are funeral expenses.99 The Law Reform (Miscellaneous) Provi-
sions Act 1934 also provided for a cause of action to survive the
death of any person for the benefit of the estate.'00 Recovery is
permitted for losses suffered by the decedent as long as the death
was not instantaneous.' Therefore, it has to be proven that pain
and suffering occurred before death.02 If the European Court de-
termines, based on the facts of the case, that this is an ineffective
remedy,103 a violation of Article 13 of the Convention will be
found.
0 4
Article 13 of the Convention states, "Everyone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated have an ef-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Fatal Accidents Act 1976, c. 30, §1 (Eng.). The section reads that:
If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or defaults which is such as would (if
death had not ensued) have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and re-
cover damages in respect thereof, the person, who would have been liable if death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of
the person injured.
Id.
98. Id. at 1A (2)(b) Bereavement.
99. Id. at 3(5) Assessment of Damages.
100. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, UK ST 1934 c. 41 s. 1, Westlaw.
"Subject to the provisions of this section, on the death of any person after the commence-
ment of this Act, all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive
against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate." Id.
101. Id. at (4).
Where damage has been suffered by reason of any act or omission in respect of which
a case of action would have subsisted against any person if that person had not died
before or at the same time as the damage was suffered, there shall be deemed, for
purposes of this Act, to have been subsisting against him before his death such cause
of action in respect of that act or omission as would have subsisted if he had died af-
ter the damage was suffered.
Id.
102. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *12.
103. Id. at 24. The Court said that in this case, the authorities had not protected Ed-
wards' life or the ability of the applicants to obtain an enforceable award for the damages
suffered. Id.
104. Id.
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fective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity.""' Although states are given some latitude in the en-
forcement of the section, the provision requires that there be an
adequate remedy at the domestic level that grants appropriate
relief to the applicants9
In Aksoy v. Turkey,"7 the court stated that the obligation varies
depending on the type of complaint arising under the Conven-
tion.0 s In any case, the remedy must be effective "in practice as
well as in law."0 9 This means that its use must not be obstructed
by the acts or omissions of the state establishment."0 The court
iterated that the State had failed to provide an effective remedy to
Aksoy, who had been tortured while in custody and subsequently
killed, by not conducting a comprehensive investigation that
would lead to the punishment of those responsible."'
Elaborating further on Article 13, the court held in Aydin v.
Turkey"' that while the State is given discretion as to the way in
which it conforms to the Convention, the chief requirement is that
there be domestic relief that affords an effective remedy."' "Effec-
tive remedy" is a reference not only to the payment of compensa-
tion but also to a total investigation that can lead to the punish-
ment of those accountable, together with the ability of the com-
plainant to participate in the investigation."' Since the public
prosecutor failed to look into rape and torture allegations and the
105. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, supra note 60, at Art. 13.
106. Kaya v. Turkey, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R.. 297 at 329-330 (1998).
107. Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996). Turkey was the site of much dis-
harmony between the Security forces and members of the PKK (Worker's Party of Kurdi-
stan). Aksoy was identified as a member of the PKK and taken into custody. He denied
knowing the member that he was being questioned about. The police stripped him naked
and tortured him by tying his hands behind his back and stringing him up by his arms.
This is known as Palestinian Hanging. Electrodes were attached to his genitals while
water was thrown on him. The torture lasted for 35 minutes and over the next two days he
was allegedly repeatedly beaten. As a result, he had paralysis in his arms and hands. Ac-
cording to the government, he signed a release and made no charge of being tortured. After
submitting an application to the Commission, he was threatened and eventually killed. Id.
at 2265-2267.
108. Id. at 2286.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2287.
112. Aydin v. Turkey, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866 (1997).
113. Id. at 1895-1896.
114. Id.
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applicants were totally reliant on him to assemble the evidence,
Article 13 was violated. 115
Once the Court finds a violation of the Convention or any of the
Protocols that compose the Convention, it is permitted under Arti-
cle 41 to award just satisfaction if it is not granted by the domestic
law of the Contracting Party."'
While Paul and Audrey Edwards' case was decided in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, it is very likely that since the en-
actment of the Human Rights Act of 1998 the domestic courts of
England would hear this case as evidenced by two similar cases
that have recently submitted themselves to their jurisdiction."7
Since the European Convention on Human Rights has been
adopted into the domestic law, judges now have the power to de-
cide whether the legislation of the United Kingdom contravenes
the rights enumerated in the Convention."8  If a provision in a
piece of legislation before the British Court is in contradiction to a
section of the Convention, the court is to declare it incompatible
and it then becomes Parliament's duty to respond."9 One signifi-
cant provision in the Act makes it unlawful for a public authority
to act or fail to act in a manner contrary to the Convention.2 '
The question that arises after the implementation of this Act is
whether the Parliament will make the necessary adjustments in
legislation to comply with the decision of the domestic courts.
This was an issue that existed even before the Human Rights Act
and one that will impact on the number of cases that will arise
under the same issue. Concern also has been expressed that the
115. Id. at 1898. The applicant in this case, Aydin, and her family were taken from their
home to gendarmerie headquarters and questioned about involvement in the PKK. Aydin
claimed that while she was in custody, she was tortured and raped. Her and her family
went to the prosecutor and complained about the incident. The prosecutor did not attempt
to locate eyewitnesses or establish that the family was taken to the gendarmerie. The Court
found that the prosecutor's attempt to establish the rape and corroborate all the evidence
did not establish a comprehensive or effective investigation. Id. at 1875.
116. Edwards, 2002 WL 347058, at *24. Article 41 reads, "If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of
the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured Party." Id.
117. Amin, 2001 WL 1135068, at *719; Wright, 2001 WL 606447, at *1.
118. K.D. Ewing, A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Ac-
countable and Independent Judiciary, 38 ALBERTA L. REv. 708, 714 (2000). The Court may
look at ECHR cases for guidance but they are not bound to the decisions. Kitterman, supra
note 52, at 591.
119. Ewing, supra note 112, at 714. This is different than in Canada where the legisla-
tion may be struck down. Id.
120. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42 Section 6, available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts 1998/80042--a.htm.
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effect of the Act has been to make judges unaccountable legisla-
tors.2 1
In any case, the final result of the Human Rights Act can only
be ascertained by the passage of time. It is an outward embrace of
human rights that were previously only implied in English law,
but whether or not its reach is broad enough to encompass all the
rights and remedies available in the European Court of Rights
remains to be seen. Regardless, the European Court is still the
primary source of all the fundamental freedoms enumerated in
the Convention. If a United Kingdom resident feels that the Hu-
man Rights Act 1998 has not protected the rights enumerated in
the Convention, he may still petition the European Court of Hu-
man Rights for redress. As a result, a case similar to Edwards'
arising today may first be heard in the domestic court of England,
but if the petitioner feels that the right to life has not been pro-
tected and that there has not been an effective investigation or an
adequate remedy in that venue, an application to the Human
Rights Court may be submitted.
Lori Edwards
121. Ewing, supra note 112, at 721.
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